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THE ORIGINALIST CASE FOR BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION
MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL*

During the Bork debacle in 1987, one of the most potent
weapons of Judge Bork's adversaries was to claim that his
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation would have
forced the Court to approve of racially segregated schools in
1954, in Brown v. Board of Education.' It seemed a fair point, or at
least one of the fairer points that was made against him. An impressive array of academic authorities, from across the ideological and jurisprudential spectrum-including such figures as
Alexander Bickel, Laurence Tribe, Richard Posner, Mark
Tushnet, Raoul Berger, Ronald Dworkin, and Walter Burnshad come to the conclusion that under the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, racial segregation of public
schools was constitutionally permissible.2
Some (Tribe, Dworkin, Tushnet) greeted this as proof that
originalism is morally bankrupt; some (Bums, Berger) accepted
it, with equanimity, as part of the price we pay for having a constitution with determinate meaning that may not always coincide
with our moral convictions; and some (Bork, Michael Perry) attempted to salvage Brown without abandoning originalism by
moving to a higher level of generality, at which it might be said
that no matter what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
may have meant by "equal protection" or "privileges or immunities," the principle is commodious enough to accommodate the
decision in Brown. But almost no one questioned the basic premise that, as a historical matter, segregation did not violate the
commonly accepted meaning of the Amendment at the time it
was drafted and ratified.
* William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. The author
wishes to thank the Arnold and Frieda Shure Research Fund for financial support during

the preparation of this Article.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See e.g., RAOUL BFRGER, GOvERNmENT BYJuDICiARY 117-33, 241-45 (1977); LAUREN CE
H. TemE & MicHAEL C. Does, ON READING THE CoNsrrroN 12-13 (1991); Alexander M.

Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1, 58
(1955); Richard A. Posner, Bo* and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1374 (1990); Mark
Tushnet, Mhat Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1867,
1919 (1991).

458

HarvardJournal of Law & PublicPolicy

[Vol. 19

My first inkling that this formidable academic consensus might
be questionable came from reading an earlier Brown decision:
Railroad Company v. Brown,3 decided in 1873, in which the
Supreme Court unanimously held that racial segregation is "discrimination"-indeed, that the railroad company's argument
that separate-but-equal cars are nondiscriminatory was "an ingenious attempt to evade a compliance with the obvious meaning
of the requirement"!4 The Court stated that in passing the nondiscrimination requirement in 1863, Congress necessarily must
have intended to prohibit segregation, because "in the temper of
Congress at the time, it is manifest the grant could not have been
made without" the condition prohibiting segregation.5
To be sure, this Brown decision was not based on constitutional
grounds and involved no point of interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, if it seemed so obvious in 1873
that Congress in 1863 would have deemed segregation to be both
"discriminatory" and "unjust," it is a bit odd that the Fourteenth
Amendment, proposed in 1866 and ratified in 1868, should fail
to recognize segregation as a form of inequality.
The earlier Brown decision caused me to wonder whether
there might be other information bearing on the segregation
question that had not found its way into the standard works on
the subject. I therefore began to investigate the treatment of segregation during Reconstruction. To my surprise, I found thatfar from being an accepted part of national life-school segregation had been the subject of extended debate in the years immediately following ratification. A close examination of the debates
and votes on segregation between 1870 and 1875 now convinces
me that Brown v. Board of Education was correctly decided on
originalist grounds, not on the basis of any high level of generality about equality, but on the basis of the actual discussions and
understandings of school segregation in the period immediately
following ratification of the Amendment. At a minimum, history
shows that the position adopted by the Court in Brown was within
the legitimate range of interpretations commonly held at the
time.6
3. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445 (1873).

4. 1& at 452.
5. I at 452-53.
6. For a fuller account, see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, 81 VA. L. Ray. 947, 955-84 (1995).
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The difference between my analysis and most earlier treatments of the issue is that I look at the years immediately following ratification of the Amendment-to the debates over
enforcement of the Amendment-instead of confining attention
to the period leading up to ratification. Admittedly, this kind of
postratification evidence is not as strong, in principle, as evidence bearing on the actual process of drafting and ratification.
But the earlier evidence is scant and inconclusive. Even John W.
Davis, arguing for a South Carolina board of education, who had
every incentive to magnify the weight of this evidence, told the
Court that "perhaps there has never been a Congress in which
the debates fumished less real pablum on which history might
feed."7 It may come as a surprise to most modem lawyers, for
whom equal protection and due process are central concepts of
constitutional law, that the section of the Amendment containing
these provisions was little discussed or debated at the time, and
that Sections two and three of the Amendment, which are irrelevant today, received the lion's share of attention. The academic
consensus that segregation was consonant with the original understanding is based on popular opinion and actual practice at
the time, coupled with a few ambiguous statements in the legislative history. Not much to go on.
By contrast, the history from the period a few years later is extremely rich. School segregation was the dominant political issue
of the early 1870s, as Congress debated what was to become the
Civil Rights Act of 1875.8 As originally proposed by Senator
Charles Sumner, the Civil Rights Act guaranteed equality in access to various types of public accommodation, including railroads, inns, theaters, steamboats, cemeteries, and-most
controversially-public schools. 9 We pay relatively little attention
to this Act now because it was struck down as unconstitutional
only a.few years after it was enacted. 10 But it was struck down for
reasons other than the segregation issue," and the congressional
deliberations over the Act are a useful source of insight into the
7. Argument ofJohn W. Davis, Esq., on behalf ofAppellees R.W. Elliott et al., Brown v.
Board ofEducation, in 49A LANDMARK Bism-F ANmARGUMENTs OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITFD STATES: CoNsTrrunmoNAL LAw 481 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
1975).
8. See Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335-37 (1875).
9. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1872).
10. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

11. The Act was invalidated because of the state action question. See McConnell, supra
note 6, at 1090-91.
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legal interpretation of the new Amendment by leading political
figures of the era.
The Sumner bill unquestionably forbade segregation, and not
just exclusion from facilities. The debates leave no doubt about
that. For example, when the issue first came to the floor of the
Senate, Joshua Hill, a Republican from Georgia, engaged in a
colloquy with Sumner in which he said that he did not think it
was a denial of equality to require blacks to sit in a different place
in a railroad car. Sumner responded, "Why, sir, we have had in
this Chamber a colored Senator from Mississippi," referring to
Hiram Revels, "but according to the rule of the Senator from
Georgia we should have set him apart by himself; he should not
have sat with his brother Senators." Sumner asked whether Hill
favored such a rule. To this Hill responded, "No," because "it is
under the institutions of the country that he becomes entitled by
law to his seat here; we have no right to deny it to him." "Very
well," Sumner stated, "and I intend to the best of my ability to see
that under the institutions of his country he is equal
everywhere." 2
Later in the debates, after Sumner's death, the new floor
leader for the bill, Frederick Frelinghuysen of NewJersey, stated
that under the bill, "a colored child has a right to go to a white
school, or a white child to go to a colored school."' 3 The leader
of the Northern Democratic opposition, Allen Thurman of Ohio,
when confronted with questions about the meaning of the bill,
declared that "I do not think there is one member of the majority of the Judiciary Committee who will not say, if the question is
put directly to him, that the meaning of the section is that there
shall be mixed schools.' 4
The bill was debated for three and a half years. Both sides in
the debate offered elaborate and sophisticated interpretations of
the Constitution in support of their position. It must be understood that, at the time, the only conceivable source of congressional authority to pass the civil rights bill was the authority
under Section five to enforce the substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment."5 Support for the bill was, therefore,
tantamount to an interpretation of the Amendment. This is not
12. The colloquy is reported at CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1872).
13. 2 CONG. REc. 4168 (1874).
14. Id. at 4088.
15. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV,§ 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
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mere conjecture; both supporters and opponents of the bill explicitly acknowledged that its validity hinged on the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, for example, stated that one thing on which
"both sides agree" is that the question was one of constitutional
interpretation, and not merely of legislative policy:
[E]ither... the democratic view of the amendment is right,
that it does not touch these subjects at all, and therefore we
cannot interfere with the right of the State to regulate its common schools ... or else it does confer upon citizens of the
United States a right, and that right is inherent ....
General Benjamin Butler, Chairman of the HouseJudiciary Committee and primary sponsor of the bill in that chamber, explained that the bill's supporters "have all come to a conclusion
on this subject.., that these are rights guaranteed by the Constitution to every citizen, and that every citizen of the United States
17
should have the means by which to enforce them."
Thus, the votes and deliberations over the bill must be understood as acts of constitutionalinterpretationand not merely as political policymaking. In my view, these debates constitute the best
available source of evidence about how the generation that
framed the Fourteenth Amendment thought about the constitutionality of segregation. John Lynch, a black Representative and
a leading supporter of the civil rights bill, stressed that his interpretation was based on the belief that "the Constitution as a
whole should be so construed as to carry out the intention of the
1....
8
framers of the recent amendments .
Let me provide a brief summary of the constitutional theory of
the proponents. The Fourteenth Amendment, at its heart, embraces the principle of equality of civil rights: any civil right to
which a white person would be entitled must be extended to all
citizens on exactly the same terms. The civil rights to which this
principle was understood to refer were, for the most part, common law rights, such as the right to enter into contracts, to own
property, to sue and be sued, to be subject to the same criminal
laws. This is the set of common law rights that were protected by
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.19 The Civil Rights Act of 1875 pro16.
17.
18.
19.

2 CONG. REc. 4172 (1874).
Id. at 457.
3 CONG. Rlc. 943 (1875).
See Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
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ceeded on a similar theory. It protected another set of common
law rights-those having to do rights of access to common carrers, public accommodations, and public facilities such as common schools. The theory of the Act is that black citizens, like
white citizens, have the right to use these accommodations on an
equal basis.
Opponents of the Act could respond either that segregation is
not a form of inequality, or that education is a social rather than
a civil right. One or the other of these arguments must be accepted if the proponents' constitutional theory is to be refuted.
On the question of segregation, the proponents found it obvious that segregation was a form of inequality. It is simply not
true, as commonly thought, that segregation was universally accepted during this period as natural and normal. Sumner called
segregation an "indignity, an insult, and a wrong."2 ° There were
endless speeches by supporters of the Act-not confined to radical Republicans-declaring that the only argument for segregation was "prejudice," and that segregation was "caste"
legislation. 2
On the "social rights" argument, opponents of the Act argued
that individuals could not be coerced in their choice of association. This proved to be an ironic position, however, for under
this theory, the Jim Crow laws of later generations were just as
objectionable as the civil rights bill. Indeed, one of the most diehard opponents of civil rights, Representative H.D. McHenry of
Kentucky, made the sarcastic statement that:
If a man sees proper to associate with negroes, to eat at the
same table, ride on the same seat with them in cars, or sees
proper to send his children to the same schools with them,
and place himself upon the same level with them in any regard, I would not abridge his right to do so .... 22
Of course, this is precisely what the Jim Crow laws did-they
abridged the right of white and black citizens to associate with
one another. Thus, paradoxically, the "social rights" argument of
the opposition turned out to be an argument against dejure segregation, just as much as against de jure integration.
In any event, the proponents had a ready answer: they required desegregation only of facilities and accommodations for
20. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1872).
21. See generally McConnell, supra note 6, at 1011-14.
22. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 217 (1872).
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which there was a preexisting legal regime inhibiting freedom of
association. The only change they were making, they said, was to
prevent States from singling out race as a reasonable basis for
classification. Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard was
quoted as saying:
It would not be denied that in traveling and at places of public
resort, we often share these privileges in common with thieves,
prostitutes, gamblers, and others who have worse sins to answer for than the accident of color; but no one ever supposed
that we thereby assented to the social equality of these people
pubwith ourselves. I therefore say that participation in these
23
lic privileges involves no question of social equality.
These were areas in which the common law permitted only "reasonable" distinctions-and States were not permitted to treat
race as a "reasonable" ground for classification.
How did these constitutional arguments fare?
In numerous votes between introduction of the bill in 1870
and passage of a stripped-down version of the bill in 1875, majorities in both Houses of Congress supported the desegregation position. At the high-water mark in May and June of 1874, the bill
passed the Senate by a vote of 29-16 and won the support of the
House (on a procedural vote) by a margin of 141-72.24 That
comes close to two-thirds. The margin of victory among supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment was far higher.a2 Moreover,
both Houses consistently rejected versions of the bill that would
have allowed separate-but-equal facilities.2 6 The bill failed only
because procedural rules in the House, permitting filibustering
and dilatory motions, made a two-thirds vote necessary. Supporters of the bill came tantalizingly close, but could never break that
barrier. On one fateful date inJune, 1874, the switch ofjust two
votes would have carried the measure, and the requirement of
school desegregation would have been written into the law.
not have looked different if those two votes had
Would history
27
changed?
But the bill, in its strong version, failed. The Democrats were
able to stave off action on the bill in the House throughout 1874.
23. 2 CONG. REc. app. 479 (quoted by Rep. Darrall).
24. See McConnell, supra note 6, at 1094-95.
25. See id at 1095-96.
26. See id. at 1098-99.
27. The schools provision of the Act would not have been subject to the "state action"
problem that doomed the public accommodations provisions of the Act in the CivilRights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Then, in the elections of that November, the Democrats won a
landslide victory. When the lame duck Congress met in early
1875, the Republican majority was demoralized. Even then, their
last great project was passage of the civil rights bill. The Democrats were willing to acquiesce in the bill if it were amended to
permit separate-but-equal schools, but the Republicans angrily
denounced this effort to introduce what they called "invidious
discrimination in the laws of this country." 8 They preferred to
delete coverage of schools from the bill altogether, rather than to
countenance a separate-but-equal provision for schools. That did
not mean that their constitutional interpretation had changed,
but only that their political power to achieve enforcement of that
interpretation had changed. Supporters of desegregated education still had hopes for the courts. James Monroe, Republican
from Ohio, stated that black Americans "think their chances for
good schools will be better under the Constitution with the protection of the courts than under a bill containing such provisions
9
"
as this. 2

Defeat of the schools provision was fateful as a legislative matter, but viewing the course of deliberations as an exercise in constitutional interpretation by persons well situated to know and
understand the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the evidence of original meaning survives the defeat of the
bill. Large majorities of both houses of Congress, and even larger
majorities of supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment, concluded that it forbade dejure segregation of public schools. That
fact puts to rest the notion that the Supreme Court had to disregard the original meaning of the Amendment in order to "do the
right thing" in Brown.

28. 3 CONG. REc. 981 (1875) (remarks of Rep. Cain).
29. Id. at 998.

